True Taxpayer Burden of Bank Restructuring by Landier, Augustin & Ueda, Kenichi
 
 
 
 True Taxpayer Burden of Bank Restructuring  
 
Augustin Landier and Kenichi Ueda 
 
First Version: June 5, 2009 
This Version: December 16, 2010 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
We formalize the taxpayer burden implied by various bank restructuring plans. Even assuming minimal 
frictions, in spirit of Modigliani and Miller (1958), when debt contracts cannot be changed, transfers from 
the taxpayer (in a Net Present Value sense) are necessary. Debt holders benefit from a lower default 
probability and a higher recovery given default. Absent government transfers, their gains imply a decrease 
in equity value. Shareholders will therefore oppose the restructuring unless they receive transfers from 
taxpayers. The taxpayer burden consists of the NPV of inflows and outflows of cash needed to persuade 
shareholders (or bank managers) to accept a change in capital structure. The government’s intervention 
aims at preventing systemic effects from a default of an important bank, and thus targets a default rate. Due 
to different implied recovery rates given default, the required transfer amounts vary across restructuring 
plans that achieve the same target default rate. In this regard, asset sales require more transfers than 
recapitalization or asset guarantees, because asset sales support a higher recovery rate. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
What is the best policy option for rescuing a troubled systemically important bank? Various 
plans have been advised and some are implemented around the world in the wake of 2008 
financial turmoil. Examples include recapitalizations, asset purchases, and asset guarantees. Most 
discussions seen in many columns and Op-Eds focus on the fiscal outlay from the government: 
how much money is needed to buy toxic assets versus to recapitalize a bank in order to lower the 
default risk (to presumably the same level). However, this typical argument lacks to take into 
account the value of assets or equity that government purchases. If the transaction is NPV 
equivalent, all the fiscal outlay is backed by the same NPV financial assets so that there is no net 
fiscal expenditure. 
 
If there is net fiscal expenditure, it must be the case that there is explicit or hidden subsidies, for 
example, in the form of inflated price to buy toxic assets from a bank or equities of a bank. What 
we argue is that this (hidden) subsidy is the true taxpayers’ cost, and that, in the best-possible 
public intervention, the size of subsidy should be set to make losing stakeholders of a bank 
(typically shareholders) to be indifferent by a policy intervention. 
 
Essentially, we rank the policy options from the viewpoint of taxpayers’ cost, primarily based on 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) framework in corporate finance and a compensation principle 
typically discussed in public economics (e.g., Laffont, 1988). Although in principle restructuring 
can be done without taxpayer contributions through debt-for-equity swap, in reality such 
restructuring is difficult and rare. When debt contracts cannot be renegotiated, any restructuring 
that lowers the default probability of a bank will increase value of debt. This increase, given the 
same asset values, implies the reduction of value of equity (Modigliani-Miller theorem). To 
obtain shareholder approval for the restructuring, the government needs to transfer some cash to 
the bank that shareholders become at least indifferent about the restructuring (compensation 
principle of a public program).  
 
We measure this type of public transfers to restore a systemic bank’s solvency to a given target 
for each policy option, and compare the size of the transfers. For example, unless assets are 
priced well below their fundamental values, it is easy to show that an asset sales program is 
likely to be more costly for taxpayers than other forms of restructuring (e.g., recapitalization).  
 
We explore our theory in an economy with minimal frictions. In this regard, our results may be 
more applicable after market prices stop free-falling and after independent audits or stress tests 
reveal more of the true asset quality of banks. However, to the best of our knowledge, the basic 
reasoning that we find in this paper is novel. We also believe this reasoning carries over any 
environment with more frictions. Indeed, the various restructuring options under other frictions 
(e.g., moral hazard and adverse selection) are evaluated and compared with each other in a 
review paper by Landier and Ueda (2009). They find that there is no magic bullet—a 
combination of tools is likely to be optimal with the exact mix depending on the balance of 
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different frictions—but also find that our reasoning in minimal friction environment carries over 
in an economy with frictions.  
 
Although the various recommendations have been given by many columns and Op-Eds, 
academic papers like this paper are rare. Notable exceptions include Kocherlakota (2009), 
Philippon and Schnable (2009), and Uhlig (2009). Kocherlakota (2009) argues that, given de 
facto guarantees by the U.S. government at the end of 2008, additional scheme should lower the 
debt-overhang problem by buying toxic assets. Philippon and Schnabl (2009) show that 
recapitalization seems the best given the private information problem in asset quality (lemon’s 
problem) combined with debt-overhang problem. Uhlig (2009) argues that there seems 
mispricing in the market stemming from uncertainty, rather than lemon’s problem, and thus the 
scheme that reduces uncertainty is the best. 
 
 
II.   SETUP AND OBJECTIVE 
The goal of restructuring is assumed to be a lower probability of a bank’s default with a minimal 
taxpayer burden.  We analyze the restructuring of a bank in a simple framework in the spirit of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958).  
 
A.   Setup 
A bank manages an asset A currently (time 0), which will have a final value y next period (time 
1). The final value y is stochastic. It is drawn from a cumulative distribution function (CDF), F. 
The capital structure at time 0 is debt with face value D, which needs to be repaid at time 1. 
Equity has book value E (see Figure 1a). Absent restructuring, the probability of default of the 
bank at time 1, p, is the probability that the next-period value y will be less than the debt 
obligation D, that is, p = F(D) (see Figure 1b). 
 
The assumptions of Modigliani-Miller are complete and efficient markets, without any 
information frictions. Under these assumptions, the sum of the market values of debt and equity 
is independent of the bank’s capital structure and equals the market value of the bank asset: V(A) 
= V(E) + V(D) (see Figure 1c). We also assume D < V(A), implying that the bank is not 
currently insolvent, but we do assume a positive default probability.1 The market value of debt 
V(D) is thus smaller than the book value D.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 A more practical definition of insolvency is regulatory insolvency. In this case, certain positive equity is required 
in order to be solvent, that is, a bank is solvent if the book value of assets is large enough (A > D + required 
capital). However, the thrust of the analysis would not change, and thus a simple condition of solvency, V(A) > D, is 
used throughout this note. 
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Figure 1a. Assets and Liabilities of the Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1b. Cumulative Distribution    Figure 1c. Sharing Rule 
 Function of Ex Post Asset Value   
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B.   Objective 
Assuming a large social cost associated with default of a systemically important bank, the 
government’s objective is to lower the default probability or, in practice, achieving a target 
default probability p* = F(A*).2 A bank restructuring problem amounts then to finding a way to 
achieve p = p* starting from a higher default probability, p > p*.  
 
Each restructuring plan provides different recovery given default. However, recovery given 
default is a pure transfer to the debt holders from the equity holders. Because it needs to 
                                                 
2 A* = F–1(p*) is the marginal threshold of the realization of next-period asset y to achieve the target default 
probability. Put differently, if the debt is restructured to have face value A*, then the default probability will be p*. 
Note that the social costs associated with default are assumed not to be sensitive to the recovery rate of debt in the 
event of bankruptcy. 
 
 
A
E
D
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compensate the equity holders, the government should minimize the transfer to the debt holders. 
Here, we essentially rank restructuring plans by looking at the recovery given default.   
 
In other words, we assume that the default event of a systemically important bank ignites a 
systemic event (with negative externality) such as causing bank runs for other banks. But, we do 
not assume that the low recovery of assets after default affects the occurring or severity of such a 
systemic event. This is consistent to assume that a debt-for-equity swap, no matter what the 
conversion rate is, would not create a default event and a subsequent systemic event, although it 
would take away a portion of the debt investors’ wealth. 
 
For each restructuring plan, we identify the least costly plan (i.e., the least transfer to equity 
holders). Formally, let the recovery rate, R(y), an increasing function of the next period asset 
level y. Then, the objective of the government is to choose the recovery rate function R(y) to 
minimize the taxpayer burden while achieving the target level of default, that is, 
 
0( )
min ( ) ( ),
R
R y F dy
∞
• ∫  subject to ( *) .R A D=       (1) 
 
We compare various recovery rate functions depending on the restructuring plans with the 
original, before-restructuring recovery function  
  
 0
( ) ,  for [0, ],
,  for ( , ).
R y y y D
D y D
= ∈
= ∈ ∞         (2) 
 
Based on this, the before-restructuring value of debt can be expressed as 
  
 0 00( ) ( ) ( ).V D R y F dy
∞= ∫         (3) 
 
We can think of the future cash flows of a bank as a pie shared between shareholders and debt 
holders. Indeed, the value of equity is just the value of residual claim after subtracting the value 
of debt (conservation of value). Formally, let the value of asset be 
 
 0 0( ) ( ),V A yF dy
∞= ∫          (4) 
then, the value of equity is  
  
0 0 0( ) ( ) ( ).V E V A V D= −         (5) 
 
We assume here that the asset value is constant before and after the restructuring (i.e., there is no 
private cost of default). This is because we would like to focus on the basic mechanism that we 
propose. In more general setting, although we do not explore the implication in this paper, 
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restructuring may increase the size of the pie. The review paper by Landier and Ueda (2009) 
include detailed discussions, summarized as follows. Government-led restructuring must bring 
social benefits; otherwise, there is no justification for the government involvement. The net 
social surplus (i.e., benefits minus costs) becomes an endogenous function of design of a 
restructuring plan. Among the various schemes that achieve the target default probability p = p*, 
those that maximize the net restructuring surplus are the most efficient—they will minimize the 
transfer required from taxpayers—and thus should be pursued.  
 
 
III.   FIRST AND SECOND BEST UNDER INSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
A.   First Best—Voluntary Debt Restructuring 
The government’s objective is to decrease the probability of default p to the target level while 
making no one financially worse off. We show that the bank can decrease its probability of 
default to any target level by converting some debt into equity. A restructuring can be carried out 
in such a way that both equity holders and debt holders are not financially worse off. 
 
This is feasible by a change in the structure of claims, namely, the partial transformation of debt 
into equity. More specifically, a restructuring that leaves both debt and equity holders indifferent 
is the conversion of debt D into a combination of equity and lower-face-value debt (reduced to 
the threshold level A*). This is a (partial) debt-for-equity swap.  
 
Proposition 1 
Debt-for-equity swap is the first best solution that can achieve any target level of default 
probability without government involvement. 
 
 
Figure 2. Debt-for-Equity Swap 
 
D
Debt
Equity
y
Payoffs of claim-holders
A*
A*
D
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Proof 
The additional piece of equity has a value of V0(D) – V0(A*). The new financial stake of the 
initial debt holders is thus worth V0(A*) + ( V0(D) – V0(A*) ), which is by design unchanged 
from the original market value of debt V0(D). The firm’s future cash flows are unchanged, and 
only the sharing rule for these cash flows has changed, so that the total value of the firm is 
unchanged (following the Modigliani-Miller theorem). Because the value of the claims that 
belong to the initial debt holders is unchanged, the value of the equity of the initial shareholders 
remains the same as well.  
QED 
 
Because a debt-for-equity swap is the first best, we take the value of debt under this scheme to be 
the benchmark. Let ( )optR y  denote the recovery function under the debt-for-equity swap, the 
value of debt is formally expressed as: 
 
0
( ) ( ) ( ),opt optV D R y F dy
∞= ∫         
where          (6) 
  
*
* *
( ) ,  for [0, ],
,  for ( , ).
optR y y y A
A y A
= ∈
= ∈ ∞  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the change in the liability structure induced by this partial debt-for-equity 
swap that makes the probability of default equal to p*. The total payment promised to debt 
holders decreases from D to A*. This is illustrated by the downward shift of the horizontal line 
for debt payoff in Figure 2. After the restructuring, a fraction of the equity is held by the initial 
debt holders to compensate them for the decrease in the value of debt. Thus, when the bank does 
not default, equity accounts for a larger fraction of the asset’s payoffs. Graphically, the equity 
line shifts up. The full conversion of debt into equity against a fraction of equity would also be a 
solution to the restructuring problem. Either scheme can be implemented by a debt-for-equity 
swap.3 
 
B.   Difficulty of Voluntary Restructuring  
Although the proposed debt-for-equity swap is the first-best solution, it is often a difficult 
solution to implement in practice (see for example discussions in Myers, 1977). A major reason 
is the speed of events, which leaves no time for negotiation. For example, the possibility of a 
deposit run calls for a speedy resolution, while dispersion of bank debt holders requires a lengthy 
                                                 
3 This scheme is possible only when debt holders and equity holders negotiate freely and reach agreement easily. In 
practice, this is difficult outside a bankruptcy regime. Zingales (2009) advocates this solution by changing the 
bankruptcy law for banks. Note that in this truly frictionless framework, it is sufficient to prevent default with an ex 
post debt-for-equity swap that triggers when the realized asset value is less than the debt obligation, y < D. In other 
words, no ex-ante restructuring is needed. 
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negotiation process. This would happen if a debt holder tries to free ride on others’ agreement on 
restructuring. Also, an orderly bankruptcy might be the most efficient way to structure the 
renegotiation process of one bank, but might negatively impact other systemically important 
institutions (e.g., ignite bank runs). As argued, we assume here that the government wants to 
avoid such a bankruptcy procedure because of the potential systemic costs. 
 
Assumption 1 
Debt contracts are not renegotiated. 
 
We examine below various possible restructuring options that do not involve renegotiation of the 
debt contracts. We also assume that transactions with external parties other than the government 
are carried out at a fair price (i.e., reflecting expected discounted cash flows) and that markets 
are efficient. This means that, for these external parties, financial transactions must be zero net 
present value (NPV) projects. 
 
Without debt renegotiation and in the absence of transfers from the government, all restructuring 
that lowers the default probability p would be opposed by equity holders. This is because such 
restructuring increases the value of debt at the expense of equity. Indeed, debt holders are better 
off in every possible scenario—the default probability of a bank becomes lower and the recovery 
rate given default becomes higher. The value of debt thus increases from V0(D) to VR(D) and, 
without third-party involvement, the increase in debt value is precisely compensated by a 
decrease in equity value, VR(E) – V0(E)  =  – ( VR(D) – V0(D) ) < 0 . The worse the bank’s 
default probability is initially, the larger the debt value increase V0(D) – VR(D) and the larger the 
loss imposed on shareholders. Shareholders of more distressed banks thus tend to be more 
reluctant to restructure. 
 
Shareholders need to be either forced or induced through subsidies in some way by the 
government to approve such restructuring. Forcing shareholders and creditors to accept 
something they do not want is legally and politically challenging although it could achieve the 
first best (e.g., Rajan, 2008, Diamond et. al, 2008). In this paper, we look at the voluntary 
restructuring plans, rather than mandatory plans, in which shareholders’ approval is needed—
they have control rights as long as the bank does not default. The transfer needed from the 
government is equal to the increase in the value of debt, T = VR(D) – V0(D). This transfer equals 
the expected discounted value of immediate and future subsidies from the government. Under 
this transfer, the value of equity remains unchanged. We examine in detail below how this 
transfer varies across different restructuring schemes. 
 
In summary, a restructuring will not happen unless the government provides subsidies in some 
form unless participation is compulsory. Many schemes, though not all, are equivalent in the 
government transfers that is required to make shareholders indifferent. The reason is that some 
imply a higher recovery rate for given default than others. Asset sales, for example, are more 
expensive than subsidizing the issuance of common equity.  
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C.   Second Best: State-Contingent Insurance 
The second-best scheme is a form of partial insurance on the assets’ payoff. It minimizes the 
transfer from taxpayers under Assumption 1. The size of the transfer can be expressed 
graphically as a function of the asset’s realization y (Figure 3a). Figure 3b shows the 
corresponding debt recovery. Because the objective is to decrease the probability of default, 
there is no need to improve the recovery of debt in case of default.  
 
Proposition 2 
Second best (constrained optimal) scheme takes the form of state-contingent insurance. 
Specifically, the recovery function is given by 
 
 
( ) ,  for [0, *],
,  for [ *, ].
conR y y y A
D y A D
= ∈
= ∈        (7) 
 
Proof 
In the minimization problem (1), the government wants to set the recovery function equal to the 
realized asset value, y, as in the first-best optimal recovery function Ropt(y) for every realization 
of the next period asset values. However, for the realization values between A* and D,  the no-
debt-renegotiation constraint R(y) = D binds.  
QED 
 
Graphically, only difference of this recovery function from the first best ( )optR y  is that the full 
face value of debt D is honored when the bank does not default (see Figure 3a). Default occurs in 
the left part of the figure, y<A*. In this region, as in the debt-for-equity swap case, there is no 
change in debt value before the restructuring: the government makes no transfer (see Figure 3b). 
 
        Figure 3a. Recovery Rate     Figure 3b. Transfer of the Optimal Subsidy 
 
DA*
Debt Recovery
y
A*
D
               DA*
Government Ex Post Transfer
y
D-A*
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When the realized asset value y is between A* and D, the bank needs a transfer D – y from the 
government so that it is able to repay D to debt holders and avoid default. When the realized y is 
above D, no subsidy is needed to avoid default (again, see Figure 3b). In other words, the 
optimal restructuring is a guarantee under which the government transfers money ex post only 
when the bank becomes a default status without the transfers but not far from solvency. This 
scheme would not provide any transfers to debt holders when default is inevitable (y < A*) or 
when the bank can repay debt on its own (y > D).4 
  
The relative cost to taxpayers of various types of restructuring depends on how close they are to 
implementing this debt-recovery schedule. In this regard, this scheme provides three useful 
insights. First, to decrease the probability of default, the government does not have to subsidize 
the recovery rate for all the realized value of the assets. It should instead focus on avoiding 
default only when the bank is close to solvency. Second, it is not necessarily a bad deal that the 
taxpayers do not receive any upside or even any positive cash flow in exchange for their 
intervention. Some of the rescue schemes we will examine below occasionally provide payments 
to taxpayers when the realized value is higher than the original default threshold (y>D). 
However, this optimal scheme never provides any payments to taxpayers but its overall cost to 
taxpayers is the lowest. Third, more transfers could boost the share price, but a higher share price 
does not mean a good rescue plan from the point of view of taxpayers.  
 
There is a caveat, however. This scheme would be difficult to implement and calibrate in 
practice. If a realized asset value were just left of the threshold A*, a debt holder would be happy 
to give a marginal gift to a firm to make the cut, receive the government transfer, and gains a lot. 
This would occur if the private side payment between the shareholders and debt holders are not 
observable to the government. We do not intend to solve the optimal scheme under such private 
information case but recognize the implementation problem when a discrete jump in transfer 
scheme creates large marginal benefits from a slight change in asset values. In what follows, we 
assume this cannot be the case and only consider implementable schemes that satisfy Assumption 
2 below in addition to Assumption 1. 
 
Assumption 2 
The marginal government transfer cannot exceed 100 percent of potential hidden gift paid by 
debt holders. That is, the slope of the government transfer function is less than 1.  
 
                                                 
4 Here, we assume that the social benefits from saving a systemically important bank are limited, and thus the 
government will not transfer funds beyond the upper limit D – A*. Apparently, if there is a need to transfer money to 
counterparties in case of default, a subsidy that gives higher debt recovery given default A < A* may be optimal. 
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IV.   RECAPITALIZATION 
A.   Recapitalization with Common Equity 
One straightforward way of lowering the default probability for a bank is to issue new equity (to 
the government) and to keep the proceeds as cash. This makes the debt less risky.  
 
Proposition 3 
The recovery function under recapitalization that achieves the target default probability p* is 
expressed as 
 
 
*( ) ,  for [0, *]
,  for [ *, ].
recR y y D A y A
D y A D
= + − ∈
= ∈       (8) 
 
Accordingly, the value of debt is  
  
0
( ) ( ) ( ).rec recV D R y F dy
∞= ∫        (9) 
 
Proof 
Bankruptcy occurs with prob(y + Cash < D), equivalently, prob(y < D – Cash) or F(D – Cash). 
The minimum amount of cash that has to be raised is such that p* = F(D – Cash), that is, Cash = 
D – A*. Even if the next period value y turns out to be zero, Cash can be recovered. Thus, it is 
the intercept of the debt recovery schedule in Figure 5. For one more dollar realization of asset 
value y=A1 in default region (y < A*), the debt holders can recover exactly one more dollar in 
addition to Cash. Thus, the slope coefficient on the next-period value y is one, the same as in the 
before-restructuring case. 
QED 
 
Because default occurs less often and the recovery rate is higher, the value of debt increases from 
V0(D) to Vrec(D). The new equity holders (e.g., the government) do not make or lose money by 
investing in the newly issued equity, as the transaction is assumed to preserve the same NPV 
value.5 Assuming no government subsidy, the gain of debt holders Vrec(D) – V0(D) is obtained at 
the expense of the old equity holders, who will lose exactly that amount. This implies that they 
would oppose the restructuring. Issuance of equity is dilutive for preexisting shareholders not 
because an equally large pie is now divided among more shareholders—in fact, the pie is bigger 
because of the proceeds of the new equity issue—but because the debt holders receive more of 
the pie. 
 
                                                 
5 If the newly issued equity is priced higher than the NPV value, no investors will buy them. If it is priced lower than 
the NPV value, there is an arbitrage opportunity by investors and the government loses more.  
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Figure 4. Recapitalization 
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To make the restructuring acceptable to shareholders, the value of the equity should not decrease. 
To this end, a possible policy option is for the government to give the bank cash in the amount of 
Vrec(D) – V0(D)  conditional on the bank’s issuance of equity of an amount D – A* – (Vrec(D) – 
V0(D) ) at a fair price reflecting the expected discounted value of future payouts to shareholders. 
With the total new cash D – A*, the probability of default becomes p*. The market value of the 
debt jumps by Vrec(D) – V0(D) and the government loses exactly that amount, so that, as planned, 
shareholder value is unchanged.6 
 
B.   Recapitalization by Issuance of Preferred Stock or Convertible Debts 
Instead of issuing equity, banks could issue hybrid securities such as convertible debt or 
preferred stock.7 This would not change the analysis done in the previous section. 
 
Proposition 4 
The impact of recapitalization with preferred stock or convertible debt on preexisting debt value, 
Vrec(D) – V0(D), and thus the transfer of the taxpayer, is the same as in the recapitalization 
through the issuance of common equity. 
 
Proof 
To show that the recovery of preexisting debt is the same as in Figure 4, there are two cases to 
consider separately. In the first case, the new claims do not trigger default. This applies to 
preferred stock or convertible debt with a conversion option at the issuer’s discretion, since the 
                                                 
6 Caballero (2009) proposes to give new equity owners a put option to sell equity at a pre-fixed price. This works as 
a subsidy to lower the cost of recapitalization. His scheme is equivalent to the plan considered in this section except 
that it requires no upfront fiscal outlays. 
7 Issuance of new (nonconvertible) debt would increase the default probability and is thus not a possible 
restructuring scheme. 
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dividends do not have to be paid out (preferred stock) or debt converted into equity (convertible 
debt) when the bank is unable to pay dividends or coupons. In this case, the amount of capital 
that needs to be raised to achieve the target default probability p = p*, and hence the recovery 
schedule of initial debt, remains the same as in the case of recapitalization with common equity.  
 
The second case involves the issuance of convertible debt, with the conversion not determined 
by the issuer (i.e., the conversion is automatic or at the holder’s discretion) and seniority equal to 
that of preexisting debt. The recovery rate is in proportion to total debt (pari passu)—so the slope 
of the recovery is the same as in the equity issue case (see Figure 5a). At the same time, the 
trigger point for defaults after restructuring is set to be A* as in the equity issuance case. Thus, 
the recovery of preexisting debt is exactly the same as in the equity issue case.8 
 
To make equity holders willing to accept the restructuring, the government has to compensate 
them with a conditional transfer identical to the one needed in the case of an equity issuance. 
Indeed, total wealth before and after the restructuring remains the same (conservation of value). 
That is, the sum of the changes in wealth of initial equity holders, initial debt holders, new claim 
holders, and taxpayers is zero. Because new claims are issued at a fair price, the new 
claimholder’s wealth is unchanged. Provided the restructuring needs to leave initial equity 
holders’ wealth unchanged, the taxpayer transfer should be equal to the change in debt value. 
This is the same as in the case of an equity issue.9 
QED 
 
Figure 5a. Same Seniority Convertible                   Figure5b. Recapitalization with Hybrid  
      Securities 
DA*
Debt recovery
y
D-A*
(Preexisting Debt)
(Total Debt)D’
D
 
A
E
DCash
New
claimA
E
D
Modigliani-Miller: Cash = V(New Claim)
 
 
                                                 
8 It is more costly for taxpayers to issue convertible subordinated debt (i.e., junior to preexisting debt) with 
conversion not determined by the issuer. In this case, although the trigger point is still the same as in Figure 6a, the 
preexisting debt holders will be given priority in case of default. This extra gain for the preexisting debt holders 
imposes an extra cost on taxpayers. 
9 In the future, though not modeled here, convertible debt can act like an additional capital buffer and enhance 
efficiency when an equity issuer is stigmatized in the presence of asymmetric information (Stein, 1992). 
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C.   Asset Guarantees with Cap 
An alternative way to lower the default probability down to p* is for the government to offer full 
or partial insurance on the bank’s assets using simple asset guarantees. To limit the cost to the 
taxpayers, such insurance can have a cap (partial insurance).  
 
Proposition 5 
Asset guarantees with cap of transfer up to D-A* has exactly the same cost for the government as 
in the recapitalization program.  
 
Proof 
The implied debt recovery is identical to that in Figure 4. To reach a default probability p*, the 
government can insure against the value of assets falling below D, with a maximum transfer of  
D – A*. This guarantees that the bank is able to repay its debt fully as long as y=A1≥ A* (Figure 
6).  
QED 
 
Note that compared with the optimal partial insurance scheme in Section C, this plan is more 
costly, since it makes debt recovery higher in case of default. In contrast to the second-best 
scheme, however, this transfer will be paid even in the worst cases, y=A1< A*. A full insurance 
scheme (without the transfer cap) would cost taxpayers more, since it involves higher payments 
in the worst cases, y< A*. 
 
It is always optimal for taxpayers to insure whole portfolio of assets as opposed to a specific 
subset of them. Future payoffs of a subset of assets do not perfectly predict the default of the 
bank as a whole. Thus, higher transfers (as a precautionary cushion) are necessary to achieve the 
same default probability. 
 
 
Figure 6. Transfer under Capped Asset Guarantee 
 
DA*
Government Ex Post Transfer
y
D-A*
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D.   Third Best: Recapitalization with Subsidized Debt Buybacks 
Recapitalization and asset guarantees with cap are just shown as equivalent. However, there is 
potential difference in that cash is injected ex ante in recapitalization, not ex post as in asset 
guarantees. If the government can specify how to use cash, especially to buy back debt, then 
recapitalization becomes a better scheme than the asset guarantees with cap. It is the third best,  
the best implementable scheme—recall that the first and second schemes are not implementable. 
 
Economic intuition suggests that buying back debt and converting it into equity is closer to the 
first-best solution (i.e., debt-for-equity swap agreed by debt holders). Altering the liability 
structure decreases the size of the transfer required from the government (see Bulow and 
Klemperer, 2009). This decreases the transfers from taxpayers required to implement p = p*. 
The government thus should utilize the buyback opportunity in designing the restructure plan.  
 
Proposition 7 
Recapitalization with subsidized debt buybacks is more cost efficient than subsidized 
recapitalization program with cash injection. 
 
Proof 
For the initial debt holders, the recovery rate function that achieves the target default probability 
p* is 
 
 *
( ) ,  for [0, *]
,  for [ *, ].
db
DR y y y A
A
D y A D
= ∈
= ∈
       (14) 
 
Accordingly, the value of debt is  
  
0
( ) ( ) ( ).db dbV D R y F dy
∞= ∫        (15) 
 
To see this, note that the bondholders that sell to the bank are not assumed to be naïve—they 
know that the value of the debt will rise as a result of the restructuring and therefore agree to sell 
only at the fair price that reflects the post-restructuring value of their claim.10 The fraction α of 
outstanding debt that needs to be bought is such that (1 – α) D = A*, and the remaining debt 
contracts are untouched, so the new aggregate face value of the debt is (1 – α) D = A*. After the 
announcement, the value of the initial debt should increase from V0(D) to Vdb(D), reflecting the 
lower default probability after the restructuring. Out of this initial debt, a fraction α is bought by 
the firm at a value α Vdb(D), while a fraction (1 – α) remains outstanding, with the market value 
of (1 – α) Vdb(D). 
                                                 
10 Note that this is a conservative assumption in evaluating taxpayer transfers, since it implies that the bank is not 
able to buy back debt secretly and restructure afterward by surprise.  
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Figure 7. Debt Buyback 
 
DA*
Debt Recovery
y
A*=(1-α)D (Remaining debt)
D (Total implied recovery)
 
 
 
To leave the equity holders indifferent, the government needs to subsidize the buyback. In 
exchange for the transfer, the bank should be willing to issue equity to buy back a fraction α of 
the debt. Equivalently, the government can directly buy debt at the post-restructuring market 
price and convert it into equity at a conversion rate that leaves equity holders indifferent. 11 As in 
the other schemes, the optimal size of the government transfer is equal to the increase in debt 
holders’ wealth created by the restructuring, Vdb(D) – V0(D). Whether they keep their bonds or 
sell them, all initial debt holders receive this gain on a pro rata basis. The remaining debt is a 
fraction (1 – α) of the initial debt. The gains of the remaining debt holders are (1 – α) of the gains 
of all the initial debt holders. Thus, the transfer by the government can be calculated by rescaling 
the realized recovery of the remaining debt by a factor 1 / (1 – α) (the upper line in Figure 7). 
This total implied recovery reflects the restructuring effects on the full initial debt.  
 
The recovery schedule (the upper line in Figure 7) of this scheme is apparently lower than the 
recovery schedule of the recapitalization in Figure 4. Therefore, this scheme is less costly for 
taxpayers than a recapitalization in which cash from new issues is kept on the balance sheet.  
QED 
 
 
V.   ASSET SALES 
A.   Asset Sales at Inflated Price 
Another popular alternative is to sell a fraction a of the assets to the government at an overvalued 
price with markup m, that is, (1 + m) a V0(A), to achieve the target default probability p = p* 
without dilution for shareholders. The proceeds of the sale are again kept as cash on the balance 
sheet.  
                                                 
11 Note that this scheme is equivalent to finding some debt holders that agree to convert into equity at the 
postrestructuring price, which is higher than the current market price but below the face value. 
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Proposition 6  
The government transfer needed for the asset sales program, which buys “a” portion of bank 
asset, is larger than the recapitalization program. 
 
Proof 
The recovery rate function is 
 
 
*( ; ) (1 ) (1 ) ,  for [0, *]
,  for [ *, ].
asR y a a y D a A y A
D y A D
= − + − − ∈
= ∈     (10) 
 
Accordingly, the value of debt is  
  
0
( ; ) ( ; ) ( ).as asV D a R y a F dy
∞= ∫       (11) 
 
To see this, note that the new assets owned by the bank are cash and remaining old assets, (1 + 
m) a V0(A) + (1 – a) A, which have higher expected value and lower risk than the original assets 
A (see Figure 8a). The parameters a and m can be determined as the solutions of two equations. 
The first equation states that the probability of default is p*:  
 
(1 + m) a V0(A) + (1 – a) A* = D.       (12) 
 
The second equation states that the negative NPV of the government’s injection covers the 
increase in the value of debt: 
 
  a m V0(A) = Vas(D;a) – V(D).       (13) 
 
Note that the new value of debt, Vas(D;a), depends on the sales fraction a. 
 
Because a default occurs less often than in the do-nothing case, the value of the debt increases by 
Vap(D;a) – V0(D). This jump is larger than in the case of recapitalization with common-equity 
issuance with the same default probability p*, because the recovery rate for every realization A1 
is larger. The probability of default is equal to prob( (1 – a) A < D – cash ), or equivalently, 
prob( (1 – a) A < D – a V0(A) ). The required fraction of assets a should then solve (1 – a) A* = 
D – a V0(A). For a given realization of asset value A1 that makes the bank default (y< A*), the 
debt holders recover cash a V0(A) = D – (1 – a) A* and liquidation value (1–a) y, that is equal to, 
D – (1 – a) (A* – y), which is larger than in the equity issue case, D – (A* – y). 
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Figure 8a. Assets and Liabilities after Asset Sales of a Fraction a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8b. Debt Recovery after Asset Sales of a Fraction a 
 
DA*
Debt Recovery
y
D-(1-a)A*
(without restructuring)
(with restructuring)
 
 
 
This is illustrated by a simple graphical intuition showing that the slope of the recovery schedule 
in the default zone is now (1 – a) instead of 1 (see Figure 8b). Note that it is irrelevant whether 
the government or private investors hold the assets, as long as the government subsidizes the 
price by a markup m so that it provides the subsidy required to compensate equity holders.  
QED 
 
B.   Deeper Assumptions: Which Markets Are Open? 
There are cases in which a bank can act right after the restructuring. For example, if large 
amount of its debt is traded in the market at the fair value, a bank can buy back debt using the 
cash it obtained from recapitalization. Also, if it has easy access to the debt market, albeit some 
premium, government’s recapitalization efforts can be nullified by the bank issuing debt to 
restore the high leverage ratio. In practice, these liability side operations can be easily monitored 
by shareholders and the government. So, it is unlikely to create a problem. Instead, if there is a 
chance to buy back debt in lower-than-face values, the government should make the bank to do 
so as we discussed already. 
 
A
E
D
(1-a)A
a(1+m)V(A)
(cash)
D
E
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However, when an asset-side market is open and highly liquid, then the monitoring the bank’s 
portfolio allocation is quite difficult. Indeed, in any second, the bank manager can rebalance their 
portfolio back to pre-restructuring composition. In this case, asset sales program targeting the 
specific assets (e.g., highly risky assets) can be nullified easily. Thus, only a non-targeted asset 
sales program is worth to consider.12  
 
A targeted asset sales program, however, may make sense in the case when the asset-side market 
is not well functioning; for example, traditional business loans without securitized market or 
securitized complex instruments whose market was frozen in 2008 financial turmoil. In this case, 
theoretical ambiguity arises about the relative costs of the asset sales program. A targeted asset 
sales program may be less costly than a recapitalization program. However, we show 
numerically that, under the plausible range of parameter values, a targeted asset sales program is 
more costly than a non-targeted program.  
 
C.   Theoretical Prediction on Risky Asset Only Sales 
We now consider targeted asset sales in case there is no market open for assets. We cannot find a 
clear-cut theoretical prediction. The targeted sales of high-risk assets (“toxic assets”) can be 
beneficial, as the government helps a bank to rebalance portfolio towards a safer side. In other 
words, getting rid of high-risk assets implies that the remaining asset becomes very safe 
compared to the pre-restructuring assets or the simple asset purchase of the slice of the original 
portfolio. Hence, less fiscal outlays is needed to achieve the same probability of default.  
However, the question is how much debt holders will gain after this type of restructuring, not 
how much direct fiscal outlays are used. Because to make asset very safe implies large reduction 
in equity values, which the government needs to compensate. In addition, removed high-risk 
assets may have provided diversification benefits as long as they were not correlated perfectly 
with safe assets.  
 
Assumptions on the distributions of next period assets become critical, in contrast to that the 
distribution F does not matter at all in the cases examined so far. Now assume that the pre-
restructuring share of highly risky, “toxic” assets AT is β, so (1- β) portion is safer assets AS. The 
government purchases x portion of toxic assets for its net present value E(AT). Given the 
cumulative distribution function FT for AT and FS for AS, their convolution F(z|x) can be 
computed for the portfolio value, ( ) ( )1 (1 )S T Tz A xA x E Aβ β β= − + + − , for given purchase 
portion x.13  
 
                                                 
12 With any restructuring plan, a bank manager maximizing the shareholder value is likely to choose safer 
composition of assets when he can rebalance the portfolio. When the default probability is higher, the shareholders 
will gain more with riskier investments due to the convex nature of payoff to shareholders. A restructuring gives less 
of this risk-shifting incentive.  
13 E(AT) is the value of toxic assets, and thus evaluated with its distribution function FT.  
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Figure 9. Targeted Asset Sales 
 
DA*
Debt Recovery
y
(without restructuring)
Non-Targeted Asset Sales
Recapitalization
Targeted Asset Sales
D
default  
 
 
The government needs to find x to solve to achieve the target level of default probability p*, 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) *
0
1 (1 ) ( | )
D
S T Tprob z D A xA x E A F dz x pβ β β≤ = − + + − =∫ . (16) 
 
Given the recovery function RTA(z), the value of debt can be computed as 
  
 
0
( ) ( ) ( | )TA TAV D R z F z x
∞= ∫ ,       (17) 
 
Proposition 8 
A high-risk asset only sales may be impossible to achieve the target default probability. 
However, if it achieves, it may be, though not always, less costly than a non-targeted asset sales 
scheme and even than a recapitalization scheme.  
 
Proof 
In general, there is a possibility that safer assets alone can still generate a high probability of 
default. This happens if the safer assets are not safe enough or if the portfolio share of toxic 
assets is too small. When either is the case, even after removing all the high-risk assets, the bank 
would not achieve the target level of default probability. 
 
In case the high-risk asset only sales can achieve the target default probability, the costs are 
uncertain. Because removing the toxic assets from the balance sheet dramatically reduces the 
default probability, cash that is transferred to the bank should be less than those of non-targeted 
asset sales. With the distribution F(z|x) changes, the target level asset (originally A*) above 
which face value of debt is honored can also be closer to, or even as same as, D.  Hence, the 
recovery function can be lower than both the non-targeted asset sales case and the 
recapitalization case.  
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However, the value of debt is the integration of the recovery function times the density function 
as described in equation (17). If there is little alteration of the density function for the next-
period value realizations, the ordering of the recovery functions can be preserved so that the 
targeted asset sales scheme is the least costly. However, with much less tail risk after the 
restructuring, the value of debt can be larger than even the non-targeted asset sales.  
QED 
 
D.   Numerical Analysis for Targeted Asset Sales 
Since there is no clear-cut theoretical prediction (Proposition 8), we compute the required 
government transfers for a targeted asset sales program numerically. Then, we compare it with 
the case of non-targeted asset sales as well as a recapitalization program under the same 
parameter values.  
 
Under the plausible range of parameter values, we find that the targeted asset sales are not so 
much different from non-targeted asset sales, and thereby more costly than recapitalization. This 
is because the costs from losing diversification effects and making debt too safe counteracts the 
benefits from rebalancing portfolio to make a bank more solvent with smaller amount of asset 
sales. 
 
Simulation Setup and Parameter Values 
Specifically, a numerical approximation is used to evaluate the integration of convolution F(z|x) 
based on two cumulative distribution functions FT and FS. This is done by Monte Carlo 
simulations of 10000 random draw for each of FT and FS. Both FT and FS are assumed as log 
normal distributions. Toxic assets and safer assets are assumed to be positively correlated but not 
perfectly. Note that negative correlation would give larger benefits of having toxic assets in the 
portfolio, and thus would be against our findings.  
 
Table 1 shows the benchmark parameter values. There are three types of assumptions: one for 
the balance sheet composition, other for asset returns, and the last for default probabilities. For 
the balance sheet, we first assume that the pre-restructuring (non-risk weighted) capital ratio is 
4%, at the regulatory minimum in the U.S.. This is broadly representing the situation for U.S. big 
banks in 2008 financial turmoil. We set the target default probability to be 5%. 
 
For the asset returns, to normalize, the means of absolute values of toxic and safer assets are 
assumed to be equal to one. That is, there is no change in the asset size on average. By 
technicality, this means that the log mean is equal to negative of half the associated variance for 
each type of assets.  
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Table 1. Benchmark Parameter Values 
 
    Symbol Value 
Assumptions on Balance Sheet   
 Pre-Restructuring Capital Ratio  0.04 
 Portfolio Share of Toxic Assets α 0.6 
    
Assumptions on Asset Returns   
 Mean of Absolute Values of Toxic and Safer Assets  1 
 Std. Dev. of Log Value of Safer Assets σ 0.04 
    (Mean of Log Value of Safer Assets)  (-σ^2) 
 Relative Size of Std. Dev. (Toxity) of Log Value of Toxic Assets κ 2 
    (Std. Dev. of Log Value of Toxic Assets)  (κ σ) 
 Correlation between Toxic and Safer Assets ρ 0.2 
    
Assumptions on Default Probability   
 (Implied Pre-Restructuring Default Probability)  (0.24) 
 Target Default Probability p* 0.05 
        
 
 
Historical expected default probability provided by Moody’s (via commercial arrangement with 
the IMF in their proprietary method). It shows that the default probability went up from 
negligible values in fall of 2008 to near 25% in early 2009 before the Geithner plan was 
announced. It was then returned back to around 5% in May 2009. Thus, our target default 
probability is in line with a historical episode. Other parameter values are set so that together 
they produce pre-restructuring default probability around 25%. In particular, we pick α=60% for 
the portfolio share of toxic assets, 0.04 for the standard deviation (square root of the variance) of 
the safer asset, κ=2 for the relative size of standard deviation (“toxity”) of the toxic assets, and 
ρ=0.2 for the correlation between the toxic and safer assets, which is likely to be positive in 
reality.  
 
Numerical Results for Taxpayer Burden (Value of Debt) 
We vary α (the portfolio share of toxic assets), κ (toxity of the toxic assets), and ρ (the 
correlation between the toxic and safer assets), separately to see sensitivity of our analysis. 
Specifically, Figures 10a-c shows the computed transfers from the government to shareholders of 
targeted, risky-asset-only sales and non-targeted asset sales, relatively what is required in the 
case of recapitalization scheme.  
 
Figure 10a shows that when the toxic assets are below 40 percent of the total assets, the bank 
cannot reach the target default probability of 5% by selling only risky assets. In this case, the 
sales of all types of assets is inevitable to achieve the goal. When the toxic assets consist more 
than 40 percent of the total assets, the risky asset only sales is slightly less costly than the non-
targeted assets sales program. 
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Figure 10a. Value of Debt Under Various Portfolio Share of Risky Asset 
(Relative to Recapitalization) 
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Figure 10b. Value of Debt Under Various Toxity of Risky Asset 
(Relative to Recapitalization) 
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Figure 10c. Value of Debt Under Various Correlation between Risky and Safe Assets 
(Relative to Recapitalization) 
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Note that the economically those figures are not insignificant. For example, as of end-2007, 
Citigroup had 1 trillion dollar asset and UBS had 2 trillion dollar asset on their balance sheet 
(excluding off-balance sheet items). As we normalized the unit to one, the difference of 0.0001 
( 41 10−= × ) is about 100 million dollars.  
 
Figure 10b shows that regardless of toxity of the toxic assets, there are only small differences in 
costs between the risky asset only sales and the non-targeted asset sales. The difference widens, 
risky asset only sales cost less, with higher toxity. However, when the toxity is about the same 
(one at the leftmost on x-axis), the risky asset only sales is slightly more costly compared with 
the non-targeted asset sales. This is because sales of one asset or combined assets are basically 
the same implication as they follow the same log normal distribution. Still, there is small 
difference because the correlation is not one, rather 0.2, in the benchmark case. That is, selling 
substantial amount of one asset will lose the diversification benefit to reduce the default 
probability, especially when the two assets have the same mean and variance, but not perfectly 
correlated. 
 
Figure 10c shows that when the cost savings by toxic asset only sales are relatively robust over 
different correlations at the benchmark value.  
 
Numerical Results for Direct Fiscal Outlays 
Figures 11a-c show that the required cash amount to inject equity or to buy assets. This is 
typically the subject that many people use. However, this is NOT we think important, as we 
discussed so far. Whatever the cash amount is, if the exchanged equity or asset values are the 
same value as cash spent at NPV, then there is no taxpayers’ cost incurred.  
 
Still, we examine the direct fiscal outlay to make sure how the different recommendations would 
arise if we use this cash spending criteria. First, in most cases, recapitalization is still cheapest in 
this criteria, too. Also, the risky-only asset sales is second cheapest in most cases, though the 
difference among schemes appear much larger than our criteria.  
 
Most importantly, when toxity is high (rightmost in Figure 11b), risky asset only sales look least 
expensive, even less costly than recapitalization. Indeed, this type of claims was not uncommon 
in late 2008 to early 2009. However, again, the required cash to spend is not the right criteria to 
examine the taxpayers’ burden. Indeed, the recapitalization is always less costly if we look at the 
true tax payer’s burden. This example clearly shows how the choice of wrong criteria could lead 
to a more costly policy.  
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Figure 11a. Cash Required for Injecting Equity or to Buying Assets  
Under Various Portfolio Share of Risky Asset 
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Figure 11b. Cash Required for Injecting Equity or to Buying Assets  
Under Various Toxity of Risky Asset 
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
C
as
h 
fo
r I
m
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n
Toxity κ of Risky Asset
Recapitalization
Nontargeted Asset Sales
Risky Asset Only Sales
 
 
Figure 11c. Cash Required for Injecting Equity or to Buying Assets  
Under Various Correlation between Risky and Safe Assets 
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VI.   CONCLUSION 
When designing a restructuring plan for a systemically important bank, a key issue is to limit 
transfers from taxpayers. Given the reluctance of shareholders (and bank managers representing 
them or themselves as stock option holders), the public intervention is often voluntary. And, any 
restructuring lowers the value of equity by raising the value of debt through lower default 
probability.  Here, as discussed in public economics literature, some compensation is needed for 
shareholders to agree with restructuring a bank. 
 
We find that necessary transfers vary among restructuring options. In a Modigliani-Miller 
framework in which cash flows are independent of capital structure, restructuring is theoretically 
possible by converting some debt into equity. This is, however, difficult in practice. Without 
changing debt contracts, all restructuring involves transfers from the government.  
 
The size and shape of the transfers determines the degree of the debt’s safety. From this 
perspective, among the schemes we examine, asset sales appear to be the most costly for 
taxpayers. This is because whatever the final realization value of asset, asset sales imply the 
largest increase in debt recovery and therefore the largest transfer to debt holders. Figure 12 
gives the summary of our results, illustrating the recovery schedule of debt for various 
realizations value of asset y and various types of restructuring.  
 
Restructuring that creates higher recovery schedules is more costly to taxpayers, since it 
(indirectly) transfers more value to debt holders. Restructuring shifts the default threshold to the 
left (from D to A*) and changes the payoff to the debt holders in case of default D<A*. This new 
recovery schedule can vary depending on the restructuring plan (three different slopes in Figure 
12). The transfers are equivalent between recapitalization with security issues and asset 
guarantees with a cap cost. A plan subsidizing common equity issues and buying back debt is 
close to optimal. Subsidized asset sales are more costly to taxpayers, since debt holders benefit 
more. Sales of only toxic assets can be more costly, too, as the numerical examples show and the 
difference is economically significant. 
 
Our reasoning presented in this paper creates a basic conceptual framework to discuss the trade-
offs among various stakeholders—debt holders, shareholders, and taxpayers—when restructuring 
a bank. In reality, there would exist informational frictions, incomplete markets, uncertainty 
increase, and possible bubbles and fire sales. Accordingly, restructuring of a systemically 
important bank should combine several solutions to resolve such multiple frictions and trade-offs 
on a case-by-case basis. However, in any economic environment, when a government involves in 
restructuring a bank, the true taxpayer burden based on the compensation principles established 
in this paper should be seriously taken into account. 
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Figure 12. Summary 
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